"krchicago" @ 2003-01-19

The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone

$15.00

Since the fall of communism, it has been a truism that the US is the world's only superpower. But what exactly does that mean anymore? We have the world's strongest military, but do not (and should not) use it without the backing of the American people and the international community. We have the world's largest and strongest economy, but it is strikingly dependent on the stability of international markets (which in turn are dependent on the stability of local economies around the world). We cannot defend our economic interests (for example, the Middle Eastern oil supplies necessary to our economy) without friendly countries who allow us to base military forces there. Terrorism, drugs, global warming, international financial markets and development issues all present problems to which we cannot dictate solutions. Instead, we must participate in some kind of global cooperative effort that seeks the good of all. At the same time, we cannot allow a single self-interested country to impede actions we view as essential to our security, and the American polity will not tolerate "undue" intrusions on US sovereignty. In this world, how should the US, with all of its military, economic and even (sometimes) moral force, go about securing peace, prosperity and human rights for the greatest number of people?

I was hoping that Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, would bring some real insight to these questions about how the US should determine and conduct its foreign policy. Unfortunately, in this short volume he provides mostly platitudes, almost no analysis, and little or nothing in the way of answers. Nye's analysis draws on several "insights." First, no one likes a bully. The US must therefore guard and enhance its "soft power" to set agendas and persuade others. Alas, no advice is offered as to how we do this. Nor does Nye explore in any concrete way how an emphasis on preserving our soft power would affect our policy choices. Second, other nations and groups have soft power too. I'm not sure that Nye actually makes any use of this insight, although one would think that it might play a role in addressing some of the concerns about democratic process in international institutions. Third, there are problems we can't solve ourselves. If we need others to help us with some of our problems, we have to expect that they will want us to help them with some of their problems in return.

Nye ends up by giving us a strategy to promote public goods and listing factors that should be considered in deciding whether to undertake a humanitarian intervention or whether to use unilateral or multilateral tactics. These provide useful checklists, but they are not really developed enough to give particularly useful guidance for developing policy.

Overall, a disappointment. I am giving it two stars only because I agree with most of what Nye has to say. If you already believe a multilateral approach to a foreign policy focused on public goods is necessary, you will probably find few new insights here. If you think the US can go it alone, I doubt that you will be persuaded otherwise by this book.