The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone

Among the strategic thoughts that I found most valuable were these: 1) a plenitude of information leads to a poverty of attention; 2) in the absence of time or means to actually review real-world information, politics becomes a contest of competitive credibility (with the Internet changing the rules of the game somewhat); 3) Japan has vital lessons to teach Islamic nations--that one can adapt to the new world while maintaining a unique culture; 4) we are failing to adapt our democratic processes to the challenges of the Earth as well as the opportunities of the Internet.

This last merits special attention. I found in this book an intellectual and political argument for restoring democratic meaning to our national policies. From its evaluation of the pernicious effect of special interest groups on foreign policy; to its explanation ("When the majority are indifferent, they leave the battlefields of foreign policy to those with special interests."); to its prescription for healthy policies: a combination of national discussion (not just polling), with a proper respect for the opinions of others (e.g. foreigners), the author clearly sets himself apart from those who would devise national policies in secret meetings with a few preferred pals.

Throughout the book, but not given any special chapter as I would have preferred, the author is clearly cognizant of the enormous non-traditional challenges facing the community of nations--not just terrorism and crime, but fundamentals such as water and energy shortages, disease, genocide, proliferation, trade injustices, etcetera.

Operationally, the book is slightly disappointing. Despite the fact that the author has served as both the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (and perhaps left the operational bit to his Vice Chairman, Greg Treverton, whose book, "Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information" I recommend be read in conjunction with this one), and as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, I did not see two things in this book that would have bridged the gap from strategic reflection to operational implementation:

1) How must we change the manner in which our nation handles information? What should our national information strategy be, to include not only a vast new program for properly collecting, processing, and understanding foreign language materials that are openly available, for but improving our K-12 and undergraduate education with respect to foreign affairs?

2) How must we change the manner in which our nation authorizes, appropriates, allocates, and obligates the taxpayer budget? While noting that we spend 16 times as much on military hard power as we do on diplomatic soft power, the author left this issue largely on a single page.

On the topic of values and accountability the author excelled. Although I would disagree that values by themselves are the foundation of national power ("knowing" the world, in my view, is the other side of the coin of the realm), the author sounds very much like Noam Chomsky with a social make-over--we have to be honest on human rights and other core values, and not act nor permit our corporations to act in ways that are antithetical to our true national commitment to decency and honesty. The section on new forms of accountability and transparency being made possible by changing in information tools and practices are valuable--admitting non-governmental organizations to all bodies; accelerating the release of records into the public domain, and so on.

We learn from this book that the author is an avid admirer of The Economist, that he thrives on Op-Ed reading (I have never seen a more comprehensive use of Op-Eds in the notes), and that he is largely accepting of the World Trade Organization and other multi-lateral groups, most of which have not yet accommodated themselves to the new world of citizen-centered policymaking. As good as the notes are, the book would have benefited from a bibliography. The index is acceptable.

If we part ways on any one thing, it would be that I am less sanguine about any foreign policy, however much it might use "soft power," being successful if it persists with the notion that we can cajole and seduce the world into wanting what we want. We've done that with Hollywood, and McDonalds, and chlorine-based plastics, and it is not working to our advantage. It may be that America must first recognize its own demons, adjust its global goals accordingly, and interact with the world rather than striving for a grander version of the "Office of Strategic Influence" that recently got laughed into oblivion. We appear to agree that the U.S. Information Agency must be restored as our two-way channel between our people and all others. I would dramatically expand USIA to also provide for a Global Knowledge Foundation and a Digital Marshall Plan on the one hand, and the education of all women on the other (Cf O'Hanlon's "A Half-Penny on the Federal Dollar").

This book opens the great conversation, and in doing so, renders a valuable service. Missing from the public conversation is the Department of State. Both the politically-appointed and the professionally-trained leadership of the diplomatic service appear to have been cowed into silence by a mis-placed coda that confuses abject compliance with loyalty to the larger national interest. If this book can draw State back into the public service, into a public debate on the urgency of protecting and expanding our most important soft power tools, then the author's ultimate impact on the future of American security and prosperity will be inestimable.

Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, presents a three-pronged strategy for maintaining the United States' standing in the world while reducing its vulnerability in the years to come.

He argues this power will last far into the 21st Century, but only if we learn to exercise it wisely. Power in this new century will rest on a mix of what he defines as "hard" and "soft" resources. The greatest mistake we can make as a world power is to allow ourselves to become the victim of one-dimensional analysis, believing that investment in military power alone with ensure our strength.

Paying attention to "soft" power, the former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and Assistant Defense Secretary in the Clinton Administration argues, will co-opt people rather than coerce them. Military and economic power can be used to influence or threaten other people and country's positions once they are taken. Soft power however, rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes preferences.

It is the ability to entice and attract. It stems, in large part, from our values -- the policies we follow inside our country and the way we handle ourselves abroad. It recognizes that power in the information age is less tangible and coercive.

There is also a benefit to not going it alone. While an inequality of power, he says, has often led to peace, because there is no point in declaring war on a more powerful state, it causes some countries to chafe.

Effective global governance requires a powerful state to take the lead. By encouraging or nourishing regional pockets of strength and acting with restraint or in combination with others, the impact of American power is softened. Whether other countries unite to balance American power depends as much on how the United States behaves as the power resources of the potential challengers.

The key to maintaining American supremacy in the years ahead, Nye argues, will rest in our ability to share power as well as to lead.

Having said that, it seems to me that this book was compiled hastily. Based on extrinsic research, I concur with most of Dean Nye's conclusions. However, his premises are often shallow - or at best, weakly articulated. For example, Dean Nye relies on passing reference to Antonio Gramsci in support of one of the basic premises of soft power - the ability to shape the political preferences of other nations. There is neither a cite to Gramsci's work, nor an explanation of why Gramsci's observations are more relevant than a more contemporary political theorist.

Finally, I suspect that reviews which interpret this as a text arguing the merits of "multilateralism v. unilateralism" may have missed the larger picture. Since even a unilateral regime can be a leading "soft power", it seems that the theory implicates more about an American approach to international relationships than it does about American policy, per se.

Compare George Mitchell's book, "Making Peace" about the American role in the negotiation of the Belfast Accords and Louise Diamond's primer "Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace" as potential illustrations of the practical application of soft power techniques in international relations.

Joseph S. Nye extensively talks about the reasons why the US can't go it alone. The changing global landscape in the age of information revolution and globalization, Nye says, is the primary reason for why it can't go it alone. A unilateral drive will lead to significant opposition by the rest of the world and it will considerably undermine its "soft power'. Nye gives significant attention towards "soft power" while he also holds military and economic power important. For this reason, he criticizes sovereignists who only consider "hard power" and champion unilateralism as the number one foreign policy pattern for the US.

The Paradox of American Power seems to be remaining in the center of many foreign policy debates since it well touches upon a significant issue of U.S foreign policy now and years and even decades to come. The uni-multi debate, which constitutes the core of this book, makes it quite relevant for both students of American foreign policy and scholars of global politics. This elegant book is recommended for the informed public alike.

Nye also examines various domestic factors and points out America's problem with converting power into influence. He also mentions popular indifference toward foreign policy which leaves foreign policy to be made by special interest groups which do not have the same interests as the national interest, which is what the citizens, after proper deliberation, say it is.

Nye points out that we should not ignore the interest of the international community in favor of purely national interest, and that the two are not necessarily incompatible.
Nye suggests a strategy based on global public needs, and rules of prudence for humanitarian intervention. He also charts a middle path between unilateralism and multilateralism.

Nye finishes by quoting a controversial former Secretary of State, "The test of history for the United States will be whether we can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms." The problem is that in the 21st century powerful men and women will be less limited than before.

In the Paradox of American Power, Joseph Nye Jr. argues that the American foreign policy machine should flex America's soft power (described by Mr. Védrine above) muscles and ease off our diplomacy by force - whether economic or military. American soft power is the greatest asset we have. It is one thing to force other nations to do what the US would like them to do, however it is another, causing little resentment, to inspire other nations to do what they would not normally do he argues. Nye charges that the US should lead the international community to design a system founded on our fundamental values that is universally accepted by the world. Our fight against an international community is counterproductive and damages are credibility and our ability to lead. Nye cites anti-colonialism and antislavery movement as international ideals of the past, and notes today's as environmentalism and feminism.

The book is a short but eventful read. Nye presents his argument with smooth prose and a measured reasoning. One might not necessarily need this work on his bookshelf at home, but it is required reading for all who have an interest in international relations and all the decision-makers in Foggy Bottom.

Nye's argument is largely a refutation of the simplemindedness demonstrated by a clique of policy makers whom he refers to as the new unilateralists or hegemonists but who are more popularly known today as neoconservatives. Because these people are infatuated with military aggression, argues Nye, they fail to understand that power is a complex phenomenon best understood in terms of its "hard" and "soft" components. Hard power consists of military and economic leverage while soft power contains less obvious but no less significant components such as cultural appeal, universally respected values, opportunities, and policies that are tied to global interest as much as national gain. Nye correctly argues that the great empires of the past including the United States ruled through a skillful application of both hard and soft power. To jettison our soft power because our leaders are so enamored of hard power, argues Nye, is a colossal blunder.

Nye also argues that power is distributed on different levels some of which require cooperation with other nations and some of which don't. He elaborates by describing American power in terms of a three level chessboard. On the top level of the chessboard, which constitutes military power, the United States is preeminent and can act unilaterally. The middle level, which constitutes economic power, however is multi-polar. In this area the United States must act in concert with a select group of other players such as Japan, China, France, Germany, India, and others. The bottom level of the chessboard constitutes trans-national issues that occur with no regard to national boundaries. In these areas, which include international finance and the actions of stateless organizations, including terrorists, the United States can only act in an inclusive global fashion. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs Magazine, Nye criticized the Bush Regime for its nearly exclusive focus on the first level of the chessboard and described its policy makers as one-dimensional thinkers in a three dimensional chess game.

Nye reinforces his argument by explaining the impact that contextual developments such as the information revolution and globalization have on American power. The information revolution, argues Nye, circumvents borders and challenges state sovereignty and control. America is both a product and a beneficiary of globalization, according to Nye, but must use its soft power to shape the evolution of globalization in a manner that endows it with universal appeal. Failure to do so could have disastrous consequences.

In his chapter entitled "The Home Front" Nye begins with the ominous observation that instead of being defeated by the barbarians, Rome rotted from within. "People lost confidence their culture and institutions, elites battled for control, corruption increased, and the economy failed to grow adequately." Terrorists cannot defeat the United States, argues Nye, unless it rots from within. More importantly, Nye points out that disastrous fiscal policies that drive up deficit spending that destroy time honored American social services can dramatically erode American hard and soft power. Deficit spending inevitably generates a recession and a severe recession will likely result in the flight of foreign investment capital thereby weakening America's hard power. But also as deficit spending destroys social services and opportunities, it also chips away at America's global appeal-a blow to our soft power.

In his concluding chapter, entitled "Redefining the National Interest" Nye calls upon the United States to pursue multilateral policies that foster badly needed international cooperation. Although Nye acknowledges that the multilateral approach provides America with less freedom to act at will than the unilateral approach, he also points out that it is better suited to dealing with the transnational issues that constitute some of our greatest challenges in the Twenty-first Century. Nye concludes that the United States should develop a combined policy that: (1) protects our traditional vital interests, (2) addresses the global public good, and (3) promotes human rights and democracy abroad.

Although this book was published in late 2002, it practically reads like a post mortem of the Bush Regime's disastrous foreign policies with respect to the Middle East, North Korea, Europe, and Iraq, which have arguably reduced both our hard and soft power. My hope is that more people will become familiar with Nye's arguments and will subsequently judge their leaders not by the entertainment value of their speech acts, but by whether or not their policies properly address the national interest.

I was hoping that Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, would bring some real insight to these questions about how the US should determine and conduct its foreign policy. Unfortunately, in this short volume he provides mostly platitudes, almost no analysis, and little or nothing in the way of answers. Nye's analysis draws on several "insights." First, no one likes a bully. The US must therefore guard and enhance its "soft power" to set agendas and persuade others. Alas, no advice is offered as to how we do this. Nor does Nye explore in any concrete way how an emphasis on preserving our soft power would affect our policy choices. Second, other nations and groups have soft power too. I'm not sure that Nye actually makes any use of this insight, although one would think that it might play a role in addressing some of the concerns about democratic process in international institutions. Third, there are problems we can't solve ourselves. If we need others to help us with some of our problems, we have to expect that they will want us to help them with some of their problems in return.

Nye ends up by giving us a strategy to promote public goods and listing factors that should be considered in deciding whether to undertake a humanitarian intervention or whether to use unilateral or multilateral tactics. These provide useful checklists, but they are not really developed enough to give particularly useful guidance for developing policy.

Overall, a disappointment. I am giving it two stars only because I agree with most of what Nye has to say. If you already believe a multilateral approach to a foreign policy focused on public goods is necessary, you will probably find few new insights here. If you think the US can go it alone, I doubt that you will be persuaded otherwise by this book.

I won't go into all of his arguments, but they are all airtight and well documented. The one complaint I have with the book is some of the economic analysis (regression to pre-industrial PCI as an indicator of economic power is flawed and I personally don't agree with the idea that industrializing states are benefitted by open markets) is wrong. Regardless, this is an excellent book that succeeds very well in explaining the situation the United States currently occupies, and what pitfalls to avoid and which policies to adapt in order for America to continue to weild influence on a global scale.

This book is as enlightening as it is digestable. It could be no more timely -- par for the course for Nye.

I highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in history, especially foreign affairs and US foreign policy. It is best to be read by someone at the college level or above because it can be hard to understand at times.

The bulk of Nye's essay is composed of responses to arguments previously offered by other commentators. It is easiest to see Nye's essay in the negative by reference to the contemporary arguments he cites. He is not isolationist, multilateralist, nor a unilateralist. Nye also gives his essay historical depth, with references to Roman, Athenian, and British history. The essay is also buttressed with 33 pages of notes and 15 pages of index, covering an impressive list of publications and periodicals.

Nye discusses most the topics of the information revolution and globalization, alluding to American military might, but not allowing that to outweigh the first two. To conceptualize the relationship between the three, he uses the metaphor of a three-dimensional chessboard. Because of this metaphor, his essay is the least Americo-centric of any discussion on this subject.

Nye most important contribution and single-most identifiable idea is his distinction between hard and soft power. Although American military might is impressive, Nye sees soft power as more lasting and compelling, and the one area, in which American influence is wanting. As recent arguments with Europe over trade and the steel tariffs dispute shows, battles over things other than military are messier than clearing caves in Afghanistan.

No doubt partisans will label Nye's essay for domestic political consumption, but Nye has navigated the rough seas of academic writing and modern polemics well. It eschews apocalyptic warnings of future doom, as well as avoiding triumpalism. The essay itself is an example of why Americans still have influence and wisdom in the world to impart. The Paradox of American Power is a light, quick read, but it has relevance, magisterial power, and, even, prophetic force.

All these facts should give pause to those who think "soft power" doesn't matter although I agree that soft power really isn't power. (You can call it "respect" instead.)

Right-wing fanatics are never going to be persuaded by this book no matter how ingenious the arguments may be. (I also think the three dimensional chessboards are a bit abstract. Really only the first two boards count.) They WILL pay for their stupidity though - along with everybody else.

Poll after poll conducted by Pew Research in Washington DC show that the goodwill of the world after 911 has been squandered. America is now more unpopular than it has ever been, both in Europe and in Russia, in rich and poor countries, and in Muslim and non-Muslim countries alike. Even more alarming is the fact that most Americans are unaware of this, believing that America is still loved and admired all over the world. On the contrary, America is disliked and distrusted.

No doubt a major cause of this is envy. But this does not explain why America was so popular before, when the rest of the world was even poorer relative to America. And is this merely a hint of things to come? Nye's warning will be remembered as prophetic. No one can accuse this bright fellow of not explaining the dangers of risking unpopularity by going it alone; one day Nye can say: "I told you so."

Nye's thesis, shared by such respected Republican Senators as Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, is that America cannot solve many problems by itself. For instances, Pakistan's cooperation is crucial to capturing Bin Laden; Russia's cooperation may be necessary over Iran and Syria; China is absolutely vital to ANY solution of the North Korean crisis; Saudi Arabia's attitude is important in the war on terrorists; and Europe's assistance may still be required for the reconstruction of Iraq, the long term costs of which will be astronomical for America to bear alone. Also, America risks making even MORE enemies by persisting in going it alone. Nye's thesis is valid no matter who is president.

This is an excellent book (one of several) by an brilliant Harvard scholar who's a liberal. Read it along with books by Henry Kissinger - an ex-Harvard scholar who's a conservative. They have a lot in common in their views - not because of Harvard, but because they happen to be right. (Samuel Huntington, also from Harvard, is an irresponsible fantast and a selective viewer of facts.) Both are brilliant and superb analysts and forecasters, not ivory tower system-builders, but practical, case-by-case, keen observers with a sense of history and the ability to see the forest for the trees (and if need be the leaves too).

As described above, the U.S. supremacy is only applicable to one of three dimensions of the international politic arena. The U.S. has more hard power (military and economic might) than anyone else. But, the two other dimensions address issues that are resolved by soft power. Soft power is the ability to negotiate, resolve issues without conflict, lead consensus, manage issues to your advantage. Nye finds the U.S. soft power is rapidly declining. This is because it has often opted right out of most of World treaties regarding the environment, World criminal courts, or other similar treaties. Meanwhile, he sees Europe has having a far stronger position than the U.S. on the dimensions requiring soft power instead of hard power.

The truth of the matter is that when you have the Power you don't want it curtailed by supranational treaties. When you don't have the power (such as the Europeans) you do want supranational treaties curbing the power that dominates you. This is a rule that has remained true throughout history.

Also, Nye ignores the tremendous amount of soft power the U.S. has generated through private foundations of billionaires such as Ted Turner, Bill Gates, Soros, and many other Americans who fund a rising percentage of humanitarian projects to improve life in the Third World. This aspect of soft power totally escaped Nye. And, in this arena, the Americans are again dominant.

He further characterizes the U.S. huge discrepancy between its mighty hard power and its weakly soft power by focusing on budget expenditures. Military and Defense (hard power agencies) spending represents 16% of the Federal Budget. But, the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (more representative of soft power agencies) account for only 1% of Federal Budget. In other words, the U.S. spends on soft power only 1/16th it spends on its hard power. However, these numbers are not representative. Obviously, the military costs a lot more to fund because of the high cost of stealth bombers, carriers, and other huge weapons. Comparing these two sets of costs as representative of the U.S. investment in hard power vs. soft power is absurd.

If we revisit the three-dimensional model. Nye makes a case that power is increasingly shifting away from the hard power military dimension to the other two that are more soft power oriented. In other words, your going to resolve a declining percentage of the World conflicts and issues with GPS guided missiles and more with loose cooperation between governments, and nongovernment entities exchanging information.

This power shift within the three dimensions suggests that the U.S. should shift away from a unilateral foreign policy stand, and rejoin the multilateral arena with Europe and others. The U.S. can't expect support of its allies when it needs them, if it chose to ignore them whenever it did not need them. Nye therefore also calls for the U.S. to commit to support the UN, NATO, and other supranational entities, just as Europe does.

But, Nye arguments are flawed. He has a biased European view. When observing objectively what has the soft power European way achieved lately vs. the hard power unilateral U.S. approach, you reach very different conclusions. We are undeniably in a Pax Americana era, as the U.S. is the only entity able to maintain order around the Globe. The U.S. is sometimes hated, but always respected. These are the assets and liabilities of being number one. This has been true throughout history.

The U.S. is the major force around the World regardless of framework. The U.S. has done a tremendous amount over the past decades in opening World Trade. Its open markets associated with large trade deficits actually supports the entire World trading system. It goes without saying that the U.S. has saved Europe from Nazism, and Communism. Today, the U.S. is a far more dynamic and potent force in resolving all the related Middle Eastern issues than Europe is. Europe is viewed as a passive player because it does not have the military capability to support an effective foreign policy.

Additionally, Nye has a cult for the UN. But, this international body has become dysfunctional and is unable to respond to hot situations around the World as they emerge.

I agree with Nye that the U.S. should exert its unilateral hard power in a much less arrogant way. A better style may go a long way in sustaining the substance of our foreign policies. But, to state that Europe has actually more overall power than the U.S. because it has supposedly much more soft power than the U.S. on two out of the three power dimensions is nonsense. Soft power backed by hard power (military or economic power) is meaningful. Soft power backed by nothing is not power. For a far better book on the same subject read: "Power and Paradise" by Robert Kagan.

Nye terms other forms of meaningful strength, "soft" power. Some of these are use of NGOs [non-governmental organisations], health care and education support, and information distribution. He takes seriously the growth of the Internet as a major force in imparting and applying soft power ideas. It's not a simplistic "pen mightier than the sword" proposal, but stops little short of that cliche. In Nye's view, "soft power" is an attractor - it helps people feel comfortable and allows viewpoints to relax and reduces confrontation. The best foreign policy is to encourage people to want to do what you want them to do. Soft power can accomplish this end without alienating others nor eroding your own position, he explains.

Nye's thesis is well thought out and ably presented. It's not a sermon about what is wrong with present or past US administrations. In fact, it's a book that could be read profitably by any number and styles of government. Every nation has some form of foreign policy, quite apart from whatever military or economic power it maintains. Helping others to agree on what is mutually beneficial is the ultimate zero-sum game. Getting the negotiators to achieve that end means applying the process Nye outlines here. That his proposals have been ignored by the current US administration doesn't invalidate this book. Indeed, it merely shows how more people should be reading this and urging their governments to give it heed. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]

However, Nye would have been more credible if he would have devoted a chapter to the difficulty the president and the congress have in confronting the influence of American lobbies. Yes, Virginia, lobbies influence our policies. How can we bring on board the sugar lobby, the tobacco lobby, the Christian Right lobby, the oil lobby, the Israeli lobby, the Florida Cuban lobby, the anti-abortion lobby, etc.?

Joseph Nye Jr. also says that the importance of the military dimension, that involves hard power, is likely to diminish in the future. On the other hand, he predicts that the relevance of the other two dimensions, more soft power oriented, is going to increase, due to many factors (for example, the information revolution). However, a state has to take into account not only soft power but also hard power in order to achieve success in its policies.

He also tries to make the idea of the three dimensions of power more easily understandable by comparing power to a three-dimensional chessboard, where you have to play in the three dimensions if you want to win. The problem, according to him, is that USA is increasingly paying attention only to the military dimension of power, and due to that it is likely to have more than a few problems in the long term. A onedimensional player in a three dimensional game can only lose...

On the whole, a very good book that can help you to understand better what is happening today ... Recommended !!!

And on the cover Madeleine Albright is quoted as saying: "Nye provides an excellent framework for viewing the US's role in the 21st Century - especially after the events of September 11."

No doubt in the works before 9-11, this is what we have been waiting for to get us - Major and minor parties alike - all on the same page. There will no doubt NOT be a consensus as to Nye's recommendations, but at least we will finally be all on the same playing field - and the dialogue can begin.

Based on his definitions and agenda, that at least will be a start for developing our own national priorties. As former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Nye has the credentials and the background to put the issues of globalization in place and discuss the varied problems of geo-politics and transnationalism with authority and de plumb.

An arguement from the viewpoint of 'the establishment,' it will no doubt provide the reference points we all need to get on with solving the problems presented by the new century and 9-11's across the globe.

But being general certainly doesn't make it worthless. The text seems like a good introduction to various facets of the world in 2002...but probably not much in the way of originality if you keep up with the news and think for a bit about what you see/read.

Nye's declaration of the benefits of globalization while pointing out statistics which show increasing inequality and even decreases in rates of growth (such as in labor productivity which dropped from previous decades during the deregulated Reagan years) is rather odd. He seems mostly concerned about the disruptions caused by in the third world and the opposition to corporate globalization as a hindrance to America's soft power He notes that our economy rests precariously on foreign investments in our capital markets, which could be easily withdrawn due to deregulated currency flows. Nye writes that the welfare state is needed but has only been "constrained" not "destroyed" by globalization. Well, I think it safe to say that the welfare reform of 1996 and the recent Medicare bill giving massive subsidies to companies that offer Medicare-type plans are steps along the destruction of our measly welfare state.

Nye refers to what he calls the pro-democracy policies of the Reagan-Clinton years. If in the Reagan years, he means supporting death squad militaries to wipe out popular opposition movements to oligarchies in Central America on a bogus Soviet threat and then holding elections when such movements are banned or terrorized into nothingness then I would agree. Really is pro-democracy policies such that as that in not recognizing a free and fair election in Sandanista Nicaragua in 1984 and then continuing to use the contra's to terrorize Nicaraguan civilians to the point where the weak international court of Justice in 1986 would call on the United States to stop supporting the Contras and pay Nicaragua 17 billion in reparations? And to the point where the U.S. would have to veto a resolution at the Security Council calling on all states to observe international law? Are pro-democracy policies threatening the Nicaraguan people with continuing sanctions(made again in the Nicaraguan 2001 election) and contra terror if they didn't vote out the Sandanistas in 1990?

And as for the Kosovo humanitarian intervention, Nye is surely aware of the Western documentation claiming that the Kosovo Liberation Army was responsible for most terrorism in Kosovo in the year before Nato started bombing. He surely is aware that the Rambouillet agreement called on Milosevic to accept something he could not: an All-Nato as opposed to a more natural occupation force that would have the right occupy the whole of Yugoslavia. And he has surely read the heroic General Clark's memoirs where it is admitted that when Nato started bombing it dramatically increased the incentive for the Serbs to start cleansing the Albanians of Kosovo. But of course America's hard power "credibility" was greatly increased by destroying a state opposed to America's hegemony. Nye does allow that the ethnic cleansing of Serbs by Albanians under Nato's watch that occurred afterwards was not a good thing.

Nye mentions that U.S. economic sanctions failed to dislodge Saddam. Well he should know that the U.S. wanted him to remain in power after the gulf war because it didn't trust the Iraqi rebels and preferred Saddam remain in power for the moment and eventually be overthrown by "iron-fisted Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein" that would govern Iraq like Saddam did when he was friends with Rummy Rumsfeld and Bob Dole. It surely did not increase America's soft power when throughout the Clinton years, the U.S. was vetoing at the UN sanctions committee Iraqi requests to repair its civilian infrastructure like its electricity and sanitation facilities which were deliberately bombed by the U.S. during the first Gulf War. Currently it surely doesn't help our soft power when we engage in bombing of fields and whole towns to "pacify" the resistance to our current illegal occupation and shoot dead protestors and arrest and harass people speaking out against the occupation. It surely doesn't help when we handpick their government that will allow us to sell off their resources and use their oil money to partially pay for the reconstruction of damages we are at fault for.

Nye did not mention our more subtle interference in the internal affairs of other countries, such as through funding of opposition to mostly leftist governments by the National Endowment for Democracy which has played in a role in the subversion of Chavez by the opposition in Venezuela. And recently NED money poured into Georgia after the now-overthrown tyrant Shevradnadze made a deal with the Russians about an oil pipeline after which the U.S. suddenly expressing abhorrence at his rigging of elections. He mentions U.S. sanctions against Burma but fails to note that these sanctions allowed companies already in the country to continue to do business there and enrich the monstrous SLORC.

Dr. Nye was asst secretary of Defense during the Clinton years and is currently head of the JFK school of government at Harvard. He probably had a hand in many of the policies which I excoriate. Nonetheless this is a much more compelling discussion in this book that would would expect from say Henry Kissinger, who has a blurb on the back cover praising this book.

What I fear when is the tendencies of talk towards appeasement when action is required. For example, Economists Hayek warned the world about the ultimate failures of Keyesian Planned Economies over free market economies. He correctly predicted, the preservation of freedom and opportunity always provides the best economic environment for all individuals to grow for the benefit all by taking responsibility. Great change happens when great men are moved by honest principle not just diatribe dialogue.

Another example is the late great Professor Struass`-Hupe pointing out that taking on evil empires like communism by confrontation is better than appeasement and was proven right in the end. All the talk in the world with liars of evil and the sluggish fearful do nothings seldom change anything until after great suffering has occurred.

Additionally, the misinformed media and political pundits of abhorrence often lie about America acting with unilateralist, haughtiness, and narrow-minded policies. Therefore, making honest policies from honest discussions are often impossible with intentional defamation.

The author does explain rightly so the dichotomy of American power in today's world. Nye suggests America's military and economic hard power must only be used as a last resort when international discussions fail. At the same time, America's soft power of educational openness, cultural tolerance to new ideas, individual responsible prosperity and protected opportunity can excel global change for the better. In the end, having good neighbors recognizing your soft power traits are better than having the need to have a good gun to tell them you will protect them.

Nye argues the exercise of soft more than hard power may be the way to solve global problems like terrorism, economic squalor, and ecological weapons of mass destruction. The writer focuses on these new confrontations and enlightens us why America must use cooperative engagement involving other nations before sole force in order to survive globally.

The problem with the French saying "Nothing In The World Can Be Done Without The United States...And...There Is Very Little The United States Can Achieve Alone" is simply wrong. The fact is the world cannot survive without American principles that are protected by American missiles. Consequently, I fear that Professor Nye's approach of trying to work with everyone often make policies that work for no one. And France proves this very point!

Worse, such talk as men of evil are planning to use insane tactics of bio-terrorism, dirty nuclear bombs and lethal gas can leave America unilaterally impotent ending the world as we know it. Dean Nye's book makes great sense if the world is full of Democratic Governments like America. But so long as we have Islamic Kingdoms, Autocratic Dictatorships, and Communistic Elite's willing to exploit their own people with misguided lies then often compromise, talks and appeasement are a waste of time. Worse, they can escalate mass weapons of destruction more than eliminate them.

The time is here where America might have to act unilaterally to change them before they change America and the globe. I find Nye's view that we should talk first, as common sense to achieve global goals is noble. But when the world is filled with fear of talkers afraid to act, America still must lead often alone. Knowing when to do both is the paradox according Nye.

The problem often resides with our own American Leadership flaws that often obstruct what is right. For example, President Clinton was willing to lie and hide things to save his presidency power over American principles. Thus, how can the world trust such evident flawed character at perilously times? Yet, President Nixon, Reagan, and Bush were often vilified when using American power to stop aggression that in the end proved fruitful for the world.

Thus, the views, rules of thumbs movingly expressed by of Joe Nye need to be read, debated and adopted only where they can actually work under the right leadership. And can establish a world of cooperative governments that help create middle classes so all can govern with freedom. The American Paradox may stop us from saving a world in peril by talking when we need action. Change governments that promote technological homicide of mass destruction in the name of any religion, ideology, or means to keep power must be confronted with action after conversations prove fruitless.

America is the only real superpower on this planet essentially by default. The situation may be analogous to a runner who wins the race because nobody else showed up. Why should we grant veto authority to those not willing to shoulder their fair share of the burden? What is to de done if our comrades never wish to get past the discussion stage? Also, who ever said that military power alone was sufficient? Nye appears to be knocking down a straw man. I have never heard any serious thinker make such a claim. The author criticizes our government for opting out of international treaties concerning global warming. Isn't he aware that those sounding the alarm over this debatable issue often rely upon junk science? Should we embrace their fatuous proposals merely to keep everybody happy? Is America arrogant because it refuses to suffer fools gladly? Nye's very premise is severely flawed. He tactically, if not explicitly, believes that dialogue alone will resolve virtually all differences of opinion. Regretfully, this is only true if both sides of the dispute are honest with themselves. It may even cause more harm than good if either party is indulging in self delusion or outright dishonesty. The United States, especially after 9/11, courts disaster if it shies away from unilateral action after prudently concluding that multilateralism is not a viable option. Joseph Nye should view the movie "High Noon" with Gary Cooper who plays the role of the sheriff who ultimately is compelled to unilaterally confront the outlaws because the rest of the town is too cowardly to respond multilaterally. This film will be far more helpful to him than the numerous Liberal dominated conferences he attends.

The flight of fancy - "...today the most interesting types of power do not come out of the barrel of a gun." If Nye is talking about the power of an idea whose time has come. Freedom of Religion is it.

Trust me - "Soft power is particularly important in dealing with issues arising from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations." Since soft power is both vital, and whatever Nye says it is - because he just invented it - Nye is now the logical evaluator and maker of lists of things and actions that do or don't enhance America's 'Soft power', which we gotta have, buddy.

False choice - "The paradox of American power in the 21st century is that the largest power since Rome cannot achieve its objectives unilaterally in a global information age." The choice isn't 'go it alone' or 'clear it w/France'.

The Bush vision is that we protect and extend freedom and prosperity as best we can as our founding fathers would have done: alone if necessary. My bet is that we won't be alone, especially if we win, which we are more likely to do if we don't follow Nye's advice.

The flight of fancy - "...today the most interesting types of power do not come out of the barrel of a gun." If Nye is talking about the power of an idea whose time has come. Capitalism is it.

Taking control - "Soft power is particularly important in dealing with issues arising from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations." Since soft power is both vital, and whatever Nye says it is - because he just invented it - Nye is now the logical evaluator and maker of lists of things and actions that do or don't enhance America's 'Soft power', which we gotta have, buddy.

False choice - "The paradox of American power in the 21st century is that the largest power since Rome cannot achieve its objectives unilaterally in a global information age." The choice isn't 'go it alone' or 'clear it w/France'.

The Bush vision is that we protect and extend freedom and prosperity as best we can as our founding fathers would have done: alone if necessary. My bet is that we won't be alone, especially if we win, and we are more likely to win if we don't follow Nye's advice.